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An important interpretation of Kant’s Philosophy of Right suggests that we should not regard 
political-legal institutions as mere means for realizing an independently conceived moral end. 
Particularly, it holds that the relationship between public Right and freedom is constitutive rather 
than instrumental. The “constitutive interpretation” argues this point mainly in relation to 
domestic Right and members’ relation to their own state. The latter has resulted in a statist bias 
in the interpretation of Kant’s notion of Right, which has not adequately dealt with the fact that 
Kant regards public Right as a system composed of three levels – domestic, international, and 
cosmopolitan Right. This paper suggests that rather than understanding the constitutive 
relationship between Right and individual freedom solely in terms of the relationship between the 
state and its members, we should understand it in terms of the relationship between Right at all 
three levels and “freedom in the external relation” of all human beings. This interpretation follows 
from Kant’s acknowledgement of the fact that global interconnectedness has come so far that people 
and states affect one another across borders. Kant, however, speaks of the state as a “moral 
person,” and some commentators argue that he is not committed to universal moral individualism. 
While it is true that Kant does not share the argument of contemporary cosmopolitans, who derive 
legal cosmopolitanism directly from an independent idea of the equal worth of all human beings, 
I argue that this does not mean that he is not committed to another, non-instrumental, form of 
universal moral individualism. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Towards the end of "The Doctrine of Right," Kant writes that perpetual peace is "the 
entire final end of the doctrine of right” and "the highest political good” (MM 6: 355).1 
The notion that the absence of war should be a great political good and a precondition 
                                                          
1 References to Kant will be given with volume and page number of Kant’s gesammelte 
Schriften (Kant 1900–). “MM” stands for The Metaphysics of Morals, "PP" stands for "Toward 
Perpetual Peace," and “TP” stands for “On the Common Saying: That May be Correct in 
Theory, but it is of no Use in Practice.” For translations, see Kant (1996a). “Idea” stands 
for “Idea for a universal history with cosmopolitan aim,” (Kant 2007). 
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for individuals enjoying their rights is obvious and unexceptional. However, Kant has 
a unique understanding of peace, Right, and their relationship that indicates a deeper 
insight than pointing out the instrumental relationship between absence of hostilities 
and well-functioning legal institutions.2 This insight in Kant is bound up with the 
suggestion that peace is a juridical idea, or an idea of Right, as distinct from both an 
empirical concept and an ethical idea.3 Moreover, the notion of peace as the final end 
of the doctrine of Right is connected to Kant's idea that "the general concept of public 
right" is composed of three levels – domestic, international, and cosmopolitan Right 
(MM 6: 311). For Kant, the three levels of public Right are all necessary and form an 
integrated system.4 
 
Contemporary cosmopolitans tend to begin their theories from an idea of the equal 
moral worth of individual human beings and derive directly from this idea a form of 
legal and political cosmopolitanism.5 While many political theorists and philosophers 
regard this form of cosmopolitanism as “Kantian,” contemporary Kant scholarship 
seems to agree that Kant does not share this structure of argument, where one derives 
a global legal-institutional system directly from a notion of moral cosmopolitanism.6 
In order to understand the distinctiveness of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, we must go 
beyond the type of theories where one in a first step simply asserts the equal moral 
worth of all human beings and then in a second step suggests that this moral basis 
requires a form of legal and political cosmopolitan institutions as a secondary means 
                                                          
2 At PP 8: 343, Kant famously distinguishes peace and “suspension of hostilities.” 
3 I render the noun Recht, which can denote law, justice, and right, as “Right” (with capital 
R) in order to emphasize its unique meaning in Kant. 
4 B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka. Kant's Doctrine of Right: A Commentary. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, 188; Kathrin Flikschuh, "Kant's Sovereignty Dilemma: A 
Contemporary Analysis," The Journal of Political Philosophy 18/4 (2010): 469-493, pp. 470-1; 
Jakob Huber, “No right to unilaterally claim your territory: On the consistency of Kantian 
statism”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy X/X (2016): 16; Howard 
Williams, "Kantian Underpinnings for a Theory of Multirights," in Kantain Theory and Human 
Rights, ed. Andreas Follesdal and Reidar Maliks. London and New York. Routledge, 2014, 8-
26, pp. 10, 14. 
5 Simon Caney, for example, claims that cosmopolitan theories begin from an idea of moral 
personality that they regard as shared among all human beings and that they proceed from 
that basis (Caney 2005: 35f). For the distinction between legal and moral cosmopolitanism, 
see Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, second ed. Cambridge: Polity, 2008, 
175. See also Charles Beitz, “Cosmopolitan liberalism and the state system,” in Political 
Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives, ed. Chris Brown (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994), 123-136, pp. 123-26. 
6 The point is made explicitly by Flikschuh, "Kant's Sovereignty Dilemma,”470. 
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to its realization.7 Still, I argue, this does not entail that we with Kant must abandon 
any commitment to a universal moral individualism, as some have suggested, but that 
we must understand the commitment in a new and different way. 
 
It is important to remember that we find Kant’s own thoughts on the international 
and cosmopolitan levels of social and human interaction in his political essays and in 
his Rechtslehre or “Doctrine of Right”– what I shall refer to under one as his 
Philosophy of Right8 – and not in his moral philosophy. Recent Kant scholarship has 
shown a new appreciation of Kant’s Philosophy of Right and provided new 
interpretations of its meaning and significance. In particular, it has suggested that we 
cannot regard political-legal institutions as mere means for realizing an independently 
conceived moral ideal.9 The idea of equal external freedom is evidently central to 
Kant’s Philosophy of Right. Indeed, in "Theory and Practice," Kant writes that Right 
“proceeds entirely from the concept of freedom in the external relation of people to 
one another” (TP, 8: 289). However, according to what I shall call the constitutive 
interpretation, this notion of freedom cannot be seen as an independently conceived 
end for which a public legal order is a mere instrument. Kant scholars have argued 
this point mainly in relation to domestic law and members’ relation to their own 
state.10 Thus, the constitutive interpretation of Right has not adequately dealt with the 
fact that Kant regards public Right as composed of three levels. Instead, the focus 
has been on domestic Right and the constitutive relationship between this level of 
Right and the external freedom of individual persons. This has resulted in a statist 
bias in the constitutive interpretation of Kant’s Philosophy of Right. In addition, the 
interpretation has been employed for conservationist arguments for the territorial 
rights of legitimate states.11 
 
                                                          
7 On this issue in relation to Kant’s approach in the Rechtslehre, see my "Kant and the 
Critique of the Ethics-First Approach to Politics," Critical Review of International Social and 
Political Philosophy (2017, forthcoming). 
8 These writings include “Theory and Practice,” “Perpetual Peace,” “Idea for a universal 
history with cosmopolitan aim,” and “The Doctrine of Right.” 
9 Most important here is Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom. 
10 Ripstein, Force and Freedom; Christian F. Rostbøll, "Kant, Freedom as Independence, and 
Democracy," The Journal of Politics 78, No. 3 (2016): 792-805; "Kant and the Critique of the 
Ethics-First Approach to Politics," Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 
(2017, forthcoming); Ariel Zylberman, "The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-
Personal Constitution of Freedom," Kantian Review 21.1 (2016): 101-126. 
11 Anna Stilz, "Nations, States, and Territory," Ethics 121/3 (2011): 572-601, esp. 580-81, 
584. For an explanation and critique of the “conservation principle,” see Huber, “No right 
to unilaterally claim your territory: On the consistency of Kantian statism.” 
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Domestic public law, however, constitutes relations of equal freedom only for 
members and hence can provide a justification only domestically. Insofar as people 
affect one another across state borders, a constitutive argument for public law and 
political institutions must apply to the global level. Therefore, I shall argue that we 
should see the constitutive relationship between Right and individual freedom as a 
matter of the relationship between Right at all three levels and freedom in the external 
relation of all human beings to one another – rather than regarding it solely as a matter 
of the relationship between the state and its members. 
 
To be sure, Kant’s system of public Right includes not only human beings as moral 
persons but also states.12 The three-level system of domestic, international, and 
cosmopolitan Right presupposes that states have legal and moral personality. By 
definition, there can be no international Right without nations or states.13 Next, states 
to be states and secure the rights of their subjects must be sovereign, according to 
Kant. However, the very idea of public Right involves an idea of legal, that is 
enforceable, duties, and thus there can be no international and cosmopolitan Right if 
states are sovereign – for a sovereign has only rights and no legal duties (MM 6: 319). 
Moreover, in this layered system with different moral entities – individuals and states 
– it becomes unclear what the exact end of public Right is. In the “Introduction to 
The Doctrine of Right," it is abundantly clear that the end of Right is the freedom 
and equality of individuals. Thus, as a system, one would expect public Right at all three 
levels to be understood, by Kant, as a system of equal freedom of individual human 
beings. Yet, when we move to international Right, it seems Kant is committed, rather, 
to a system of equal freedom for states. The juridical notion of peace here connotes the 
condition in which conflicts between states are arbitrated by law rather than decided 
by force. Some commentators even hold that Kant is not committed to universal 
moral individualism but, rather, a morality of sovereign states.14 However, if peace 
were solely about legal adjudication between states with given jurisdictions and 
territories, this would make the connection between the rights of individual human 
beings and peace indirect and empirical rather than direct and categorical (moral). 
Moreover, it is unclear where cosmopolitan Right fits into this picture. 
 
Kant himself was struggling to make the three different levels of Right fit into one 
coherent system. This is most evident in his ambivalence between a state of nations 
(Völkerstaat) with public laws and coercive force and a voluntary league of nations 
                                                          
12 As Otfried Höffe (Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace, 140 and 201) notes, Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism is complementary rather than exclusive. 
13 Kant uses “nation” and “state” synonymously, see e.g. MM 6: 311. 
14 Flikschuh, "Kant's Sovereignty Dilemma.”  
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(Völkerforbund).15 His troubles here are not merely empirical but normative and 
conceptual. I shall not focus on Kant's ambivalence regarding global institutions but 
take us one step back to the very meaning and foundation of Right, specifically to the 
mentioned idea that Right “proceeds entirely from the concept of freedom in the external 
relation of people to one another” (TP, 8: 289, first emphasis added). Kant's argument 
would lack coherence and unity, if the three levels of public Right were based on 
different principles. Moreover,  Kant has only one principle of Right, one Universal 
Principle of Right, and this concerns the equal freedom of individual human beings (MM 
6: 230). And there is only one innate right of humanity, which again belongs to 
persons in virtue of their humanity, and not to states (MM 6: 237). For Kant's system 
of Right to have unity and coherence, perpetual peace must have a direct – that is, 
non-instrumental and categorical – relation to the equal freedom of individual human 
beings. Only in this way can it be "the entire final end of the doctrine of right.” Or so 
I argue. 
 
In the next section, I explain the constitutive interpretation of Right and lay out the 
connection between this interpretation and a relational notion of freedom. Moreover, 
I argue that former versions of the constitutive interpretation have had a statist bias. 
The Kantian focus on the state and the idea that public law is not a mere instrument 
to the fulfillment of individual ends may be thought to imply that Kant is not a 
universal moral individualist. However, in section III, I show that Kant is indeed a 
universal moral individualist, because the basic principles of his Philosophy of Right 
concerns human beings rather than states. Section IV takes up Kant’s distinction 
between provisional and conclusive rights, and argues that the domestic level of Right 
cannot secure the conclusiveness of rights independently of the international and 
cosmopolitan levels of Right. This is the case because we cannot neatly separate the 
relations a state has to its own members and the relations it has to other states and 
their members. In section V, I show that statist interpretations of Kant fail, because 
they cannot explain how the acts of a state, as “simply a power,” toward other states 
and foreigners can be justified. Section VI concludes that Kant’s view of Right 
requires that we take a systemic perspective encompassing all the relations in which 
human beings stand to one another and aim at that all of these are ordered by public 
laws securing the universal co-existence of freedom. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
15 Byrd and Hruschka, Kant's Doctrine of Right, 198-200. 
6 
 
II. The constitutive interpretation of Right 
 
I begin from the fact that Kant regards peace as a matter of Right, rather than of 
ethics: "This rational idea of a peaceful, even if not friendly, thoroughgoing community 
of all nations that can come into relations affecting one another is not a philanthropic 
(ethical) principle but a juridical principle [ein rechtliches Prinzip]" (MM 6: 352).16 A 
juridical principle is a principle for the public and positive legal ordering of external 
relations between persons, rather than a principle persons must make the motive of 
their actions (MM 6: 213-14, 218-21). Insofar as peace relates to the community of all 
nations, to speak of it as a juridical principle indicates that it is a principle for the right 
ordering of a global public legal order. Moreover, to speak of peace in terms of Right 
means that it is a condition that must be established by agreement and one that must 
provide assurance of compliance to the parties. Peace cannot merely be based on good 
will or sympathy; it requires the rules and assurance provided by a juridical condition 
(PP 8: 349). 
 
Central to public Right are public and positive laws, and a common will under which 
people – or peoples – affecting one another are subjected. “Public right is therefore a 
system of laws for a people, that is, a multitude of human beings, or for a multitude 
of peoples, which, because they affect one another, need a rightful condition under a 
will uniting them, a constitution (constitutio), so that they may enjoy what is laid down 
as right" (MM 6: 311, emphases changed). Moreover, coercion is internal to the very 
concept of Right. Indeed, "Right and authorization to use coercion … mean one and 
the same thing" (MM 6: 232). Right, in Kant, however, is not merely an empirical 
description of positive law. The reason why Right is internally connected to coercion 
is that equal external freedom is possible only if those who infringe on the equal 
freedom of others are hindered in doing so by coercive laws, "as a hindering of a 
hindrance to freedom" (MM 6: 231). Universal coexistence of individual freedom is what 
Right means in Kant.17 Thus, he posits The Universal Principle of Right (UPR): "Any 
action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal 
law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s 
freedom in accordance with a universal law" (MM, 6: 230). Notice that the UPR is 
                                                          
16 Mary Gregor translates “ein rechtliches Prinzip” as "a principle having to do with rights," but I 
think it more appropriate with “a juridical principle” to emphasize the demarcation of the 
juridical sphere in Kant. 
17 [Höffe 2006, 156] 
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not directed to the individual, in the same way that the categorical imperative is, but 
is a principle for the right ordering of the public legal order.18 
 
According to the constitutive interpretation, we would fail to acknowledge one of the 
central insights of Kant's Philosophy of Right, if we saw political-legal institutions as 
mere instruments for the realization of a moral ideal. Kant’s position, therefore, is 
best understood in contrast to an instrumental view of public law. Political-legal 
instrumentalism, as we might call the contrasting view, perceives political and legal 
institutions as contingent means for the realization of independently conceived 
valuable ends. The ends are independently conceived in the sense of being fully 
describable without any reference to the institutions that are the means to their 
realization.19 A political legal instrumentalism based on freedom would regard public 
law or a political entity as justified if it promoted an independently conceived idea of 
freedom. Kant, to be sure, places the idea of freedom at the center of his Philosophy 
of Right, but it would be a mistake to think that he justifies public law merely as a 
means to realize some value or good that that the individual can understand 
independently of his or her relations to others as organized by public law. Rather, the 
meaning and value of freedom is partly constituted by – partly created and made 
conceivable by – public law (MM 6: 316).20 
 
Two aspects of the idea of the constitutive relationship between public law and 
freedom are especially important for our discussion of the relationship between 
individuals and states, as well as for the question of Kant’s individualism. First, the 
idea that freedom depends on public law - “the dependence of all upon a common 
legislation” (PP, 8: 349–50, emphasis in original; see also MM 6: 316) – seems to give 
a strong role to the state, at least if we regard the state as the actualization of the idea 
of public law or the public legal order.21 If individual freedom is bound up with the 
existence of the state, one cannot give priority to individual freedom over the state. 
Second, external freedom is not justified in Kant from the first-person perspective of 
                                                          
18 Thomas W. Pogge." Is Kant’s Rechtslehre a ‘Comprehensive Liberalism’?" In: Elisabeth Ellis, 
ed. Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2012, pp. 81-82. 
19 See Alon Harel, Why Law Matters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) and Arthur 
Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2009) who both describe this legal instrumentalism and advance non-
instrumental alternatives. 
20 Rostbøll, “Democracy as Good in Itself”; "Kant, Freedom as Independence, and 
Democracy," 792, 795-7. 
21 Ripstein (Force and Freedom) speaks of the “public legal order”; Zylberman (“The Public 
Form of Law”) of “public law.” The relationship between these ideas and the state are not 
always clear. 
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the individual, but rather denotes a relationship between a plurality of human beings 
living under shared law. This is why he speaks of “freedom in the external relation of 
people to one another” [“Freiheit im äuβeren Verhältnisse der Menchen zueinander”] and 
notes that Right has “nothing to do with the end that all [people] naturally have” (TP, 
8: 289, emphasis added). In this way, we might say that external freedom for Kant is 
not first-personal but rather second-personal or relational.22 
 
A first-personal view of freedom takes the perspective of the first person singular 
without reference to the relations she has to other persons. I take the first personal 
view of freedom, for example, when I ask if I am free to act without obstruction or 
to set my own ends. When freedom is defined as a matter of non-interference, this is 
a first-personal view of freedom, because a person can understand what it means to 
act without interference without reference to the relations she has to other persons.23 
Kant’s view of freedom should be seen in contrast to this first personal view. 
Freedom, in Kant, is second personal or relational, because it is not a question of 
what one can have or get but rather of the relations in which one stands to other 
persons, of what one can demand of others within those relations. This does not 
mean that setting ends for oneself is irrelevant in the Kantian account, but this is not 
an end that explains the meaning and value of freedom, as it does on a first personal 
account. Rather, what comes first in Kant’s view is the relational norm that others are 
not entitled to set purposes for you because you are not their subordinate.24 Freedom 
in Kant’s Philosophy of Right is a matter of which standing one has among other 
people, that is, of one’s rights and duties in relation to other human beings. These 
rights and duties are defined by public law, which shows the connection between the 
relational view of freedom and the constitutive interpretation of Right. Freedom, as a 
matter of the external relation of individuals to one another, is constituted by public 
Right. From the first personal perspective, law will be seen as limiting freedom, while 
from the relational or second personal perspective, public law, when in conformity 
with Right, will be seen as constitutive of freedom (MM 6:315-16).25  
 
                                                          
22 Zylberman, “The Public Form of Law,” 2016: 102-3, 108-111. For the distinction 
between first and second personal views, see Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: 
Moral, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 3-10.   
23 Thomas Hobbes’ definition of freedom is the classical example: “Liberty, or freedom, 
signifieth (properly) the absence of opposition; (by opposition, I mean external 
impediments of motion;).” Thus, a free man is someone who “finds no stop, in doing what 
he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.” Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), ch. XXI, pp. 139 and 140. 
24 Ripstein in Freedom and Force: Essays on Kant’s legal Philosophy, ed. Sari Kisilsky and Martin J. 
Stone (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017): 183-217, pp. 194-96 
25 Zylberman, (“The Public Form of Law,” 104-105). 
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The sovereign state plays a prominent role in the constitutive and relational 
interpretation of Kant, because it is seen as the precondition for the realization of 
external freedom. More specifically, a public legal order qua a state solves three 
problems in the state of nature, namely the problem of unilateral determination of 
rights, the problem of assurance and enforcement of rights, and the problem of 
indeterminacy of rights.26 The state provides procedures for establishing a common 
will, which can lay down what is right, and which has the power to assure everyone 
subject to it of the security of their rights, as well as judge cases of indeterminacy. For 
Kant this is particularly important in relation to property rights, which have a 
conventional element and can be enforced in accordance with the coexistence of 
freedom only by a common will, which has no purposes of its own. If property rights 
were enforced by a unilateral will, some would be subject to the will or purposes of 
another (MM 6: 256). Moreover, for Kant, in order for the state to be a state, the ruler 
must be sovereign and have no legal duties to his subjects "that he can be coerced to 
fulfill" (MM 6: 319). Only a sovereign state can solve the three defects of the state of 
nature. Following this line of reasoning and interpretation of Kant, it is tempting to 
conclude that “recognizing the equal sovereignty of states is part and parcel of 
respecting each person’s right to freedom.”27 This conclusion, however, is premature, 
because it would entail that sovereign states could secure freedom and rights on their 
own with no other levels of Right. Thus, there is a tendency to assume that the idea 
of the constitutive relationship between the state as a public legal order and freedom 
as independence must lead to the conclusion that only domestic Right is constitutively 
related to individual freedom, while the two other levels of Right exist only as 
instruments for securing domestic right. But that is not Kant’s view – nor is it a 
tenable view. 
 
While I agree with the interpretation that emphasizes the constitutive relationship 
between public law or Right on the one hand and external freedom on the other hand, 
I think it is a mistake to tie the idea of public law exclusively to the sovereign state, 
particularly to any old state. Right, in Kant, is not merely a description of the legal 
order of any particular state (MM 6: 229-230).28 First, Recht is a normative idea and 
not an empirical description. Right has normative elements; there are content 
constraints on what the sovereign can decide in order for its commands to be proper 
laws or Recht. This is the reason why Kant posits a Universal Principle of Right and 
                                                          
26 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 145-181. 
27 Mikalsen, “No cosmopolitan morality without state sovereignty,” 2017, 9. See also Stilz’ 
argument for states’ rights to their territory, which she sees as based on what she takes to 
be a Kantian idea, namely that states “are necessary to provide a unitary and public 
interpretation of rights of individuals” (Stilz 2011, 580). 
28 See also (Höffe 2006, 82; Wood 2002, 6). 
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an innate right of humanity. Second, “we have to take into consideration not only the 
relation of one state to another as a whole, but also the relation of individual persons 
of one state toward the individuals of another, as well as toward another state as a 
whole” (MM 6: 343-344).] “Right” concerns not merely the internal legal order of 
states (domestic Right) but also the relationship between states (international Right) 
and the relationship between states and foreign individuals (cosmopolitan Right). In 
Kant, there is one “general concept of right” with three levels, and “if the principle 
of outer freedom limited by law is lacking in any of these three possible forms of 
rightful condition, the framework of all the others is unavoidably undermined and 
must finally collapse” (MM 6: 311). 
 
The mistake is to read the constitutive view as a matter of the mutual dependence or 
co-constitutiveness of domestic law and individual freedom, rather than of public Right 
in all its three levels on the one side and external freedom on the other side. Even if 
the public law of the state is not seen in descriptive or positivistic terms internally, 
that is, even if it is recognized that the state must honor the constraint set up by the 
UPR and the innate right to freedom of its own members, the statist interpretation 
still views the global level in empirical terms. That is, it takes for granted existing 
boundaries and territories. The argument that only states that treats their own subjects 
according to the principles of (domestic) Right have a right to territorial integrity 
similarly treats existing territories of internally legitimate states descriptively.29 
However, theorizing the authority and legitimacy of states only in relation to how they 
treat their own subjects both contradicts Kant’s view of Right as composed of three, 
mutually dependent levels, and creates an untenable schism between a normative 
conception of Right at the domestic level and a (at least partly) contingent one at the 
international and cosmopolitan levels. 
 
Following from the preceding arguments, my suggestion is that we should not see the 
constitutive relationship between Right or public law as a matter only of the 
relationship between the state and its citizens, but between Right at all three levels and 
“freedom in the external relation” of all human beings. As mentioned, the core idea of 
Kant’s Philosophy of Right is that public law is not justified merely as the best means 
to a predefined end, but rather as creating a specific relationship between individual 
human beings. There is a risk in the constitutive interpretation to fail to incorporate 
this insight, when it comes to international and cosmopolitan Right. If individual 
freedom is fully and conclusively constituted by the state, the two other levels of Right 
can at best have an instrumental relationship to freedom. 
                                                          
29 For example, Anna Stilz’ (2011) Kantian argument for territorial rights, "Nations, States, 
and Territory," Ethics 121/3 (2011): 572-601. 
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It might be said that international Right constitutes not the freedom of individual 
human beings but the freedom or sovereignty of individual states. But this answer 
raises the question of how the constitution of equal state sovereignty relates to the 
fundamental meaning and role of Right, which is to create the right external relation 
between individual human beings, or the universal coexistence of individual freedom. 
I discuss this question in the following sections. 
 
 
III. States and universal moral individualism 
 
I have argued that we should see all three levels of Right in relation to the external 
freedom of individual human beings. This interpretation entails that Kant is a 
universal moral individualist of sorts. However, prominent Kant scholars have argued 
that Kant is not committed to “universal moral individualism” but, rather, provides 
“a morality of sovereign states.”30 There are two main reasons to think that Kant is 
not committed to universal moral individualism that are relevant for our discussion.31 
First, Kant speaks not only of the right of individuals but also speaks of the state “as 
a moral person” that should not be "made into a thing" (PP 8: 344).32 Second, in 
justifying Right, Kant does not take the first-personal perspective of an individual but 
rather the second-personal view of relations between persons. I shall argue that none 
of these reasons are sufficient to show that Kant is not a universal moral individualist. 
While it is true that Kant rejects one form of moral individualism, he does not reject 
all types of universal moral individualism. Indeed, from Kant we might learn to think 
of universal moral individualism in a new and different way than what has become 
standard. 
 
To make headway in this discussion, we must begin by defining moral (or value) 
individualism. Some define value individualism as the view that “only the lives of 
individual human beings have ultimate value, and collective identities derive their 
                                                          
30 Flikschuh 2010: 470, 469. 
31 Flikschuh argues that Kant is not committed to moral individualism in two different 
connections, the first in a discussion of Kant’s view of state sovereignty (2010: 469-70), and 
the second in a discussion of Kant’s view of autonomy (“Personal Autonomy and Public 
Authority,” in Kant on Moral Autonomy, ed. Oliver Sensen, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013, 169-189, pp. 172-3). 
32 On the state as a moral person in Kant, see B. Sharon Byrd, “The State as a ‘Moral 
Person,’” in Kant and Law, ed. B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2006): 379-97; Holland, 2017, 601-607. 
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value from their contribution to the lives of individual human beings.”33 This view is 
contrasted with value collectivism, “the view that a collective entity can have value 
independently of its contribution to the wellbeing of individual human beings.”34 
Framed in this way, it is counterintuitive to endorse value collectivism and it becomes 
unclear who would endorse such a view. We should note two things about these 
definitions. First, both value individualism and value collectivism are here defined as 
a matter of wellbeing, that is, internal states of being. This assumes a first-personal or 
a third-personal account of morality, which focuses on what ought to be brought 
about, and excludes relational accounts, which focus on the status persons ought to 
have in relation to one another. Second, and relatedly, these definitions force us to 
choose between an individualist view, in which collective entities can have only 
instrumental value and a collectivist view, in which the value of the collective entity is 
independent of individuals. This again excludes relational views such as Kant’s, which 
is neither instrumentalist nor independent of individuals. 
 
If we define a moral individualist theory as one, which regards morality as a question 
of what is good or to the benefit of the individual from his own, isolated perspective, 
Kant’s Philosophy of Right is not a moral individualist theory – nor is his moral theory 
as a whole. But obviously this does mean that he accepts a form of collectivism, 
according to which morality is based on what is good for some collective entity 
understood independently of the individuals who compose it. Rather, Kant rejects the 
whole idea that morality is about what is good for or benefits someone, be it an 
individual person or a collective entity such as a state. In Kant, morality, including 
Right, is about how persons relate to one another, about their external standing 
among one another, and not about internal states of being. Right concerns "that relation 
of human beings among one another that contains the conditions under which alone 
everyone is able to enjoy his rights" (MM, 6: 305-306, emphasis changed).  
 
The question of freedom, therefore, should not be approached from the perspective 
of the first-person singular, but from the shared perspective of “a multitude of human 
beings [who] affect one another” (MM, 6: 311).35 Right is not about what the 
individual person can gain, but how a plurality of persons who inevitably affect one 
another ought to be related. This view is still individualistic rather than collectivistic, 
since it is about how individual human beings relate to one another, and not about the 
                                                          
33 Michael Hartney, “Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights,” Canadian Journal of 
Law and Jurisprudence IV, no. 2 (1991): 293-314, p. 297. 
34 Ibid. See also Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman, “The Deontological 
Defense of Democracy: An Argument from Group Rights,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 
(2008): 279-293, p. 285. 
35 Rostbøll, "Kant, Freedom as Independence, and Democracy," 797. 
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good of some collective entity understood independently of the individuals 
composing it. If we take moral individualism to mean that we can derive what is 
morally good from what is individually good (good for me seen in isolation from 
others), then Kant is not a moral individualist. But if we include in the idea of moral 
individualism theories that focus on how individual persons ought to stand in relation 
to one another, then Kant is a moral individualist. 
 
Moral individualism is sometimes rejected because it is thought to entail that collective 
goods can have only instrumental or causal value. Joseph Raz, for example, thinks 
moral individualism entails this view of collective goods and rejects it, because he 
thinks collective goods can have intrinsic value, too.36 Kant, according to the 
constitutive interpretation, rejects the idea that a public legal order has value only as 
an external causal means to individual ends. We have said that the relationship 
between the public legal order and individual freedom is constitutive rather than 
instrumental, but does that mean that a public legal order cum the state is intrinsically 
valuable? I think the public legal order or state is intrinsically good only in one of 
three ways things can be intrinsically good, according to Raz. That is, the state can be 
a constituent good, because it creates relations among individuals the value of which 
cannot exist or even fully be conceived without the idea of a public legal order. But 
this does not mean that the state is valuable in itself “irrespective of what else exists,” 
or that the state is an ultimate value in the sense that it can explain “the value of non-
ultimate goods.”37 In Kant, the value of the state cannot be understood irrespective 
of the existence of individuals and its value cannot be understood as bestowing value 
on other, non-ultimate goods. Thus, even if the value of the state is not merely 
instrumental in Kant, its value is also not intrinsic, if we regard “intrinsic goodness” 
to include unconditionality and ultimateness.38 
 
If we see Right in Kant not as a description of an actual legal order, domestic or 
global, but as a normative idea, we must take outset in what Kant writes about Right 
in the “Introduction to The Doctrine of Right.” The “Introduction” provides the 
definition of Right and can be seen as the moral ground of the entire doctrine of 
Right, including international and cosmopolitan Right. In the “Introduction,” Right 
is defined as a relation between individual choices under universal law (MM 6: 230), 
and the Universal Principle of Right mentions only individual persons. Moreover, 
there is only one innate right, and it belongs to the individual human being: "Freedom 
                                                          
36 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 198-203. 
37 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 200. 
38 Thus, the state is not an intrinsic good, as this is defined by Christine Korsgaard, “Two 
Distinctions in Goodness.” In Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 249-74. 
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(independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist 
with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original 
right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity" (MM, 6: 237, emphasis changed). The 
UPR and the innate right to freedom fit badly with an idea of some collective identity 
being good in itself and an ultimate value. This is true even if we accept the 
constitutive interpretation, according to which freedom should not be understood as 
an individual possession or an individual good, but rather as a rightful relation among 
persons. The only way in which we can give the state equal value to the individual 
human being is by positing a different concept of Right for the international realm 
than for the domestic realm. However, for Kant there is only one concept of Right, 
and it concerns the universal coexistence of individual freedom. 
 
In order to understand Kant’s unique view of Right in and beyond states, it is crucial 
to appreciate that he does not merely see political-legal institutions as contingent 
means to the realization of ends that are defined independently of these institutions. 
For this reason, Kant can also not regard public legal orders as dispensable means 
that can be exchanged for other means. For the end to be realized is partly constituted 
by the existence of a public legal order. However, we go wrong if we take these 
important insights to imply that Kant regards existing states as ends in themselves on 
par with individual human beings. The latter is a mistake, both because a public legal 
order should not be equated with the empirical state, as argued in the previous section, 
and because of Kant’s universal moral individualism, as explained in this section. In 
the following sections, I provide further argument for this conclusion. 
 
 
IV. Provisional and conclusive rights 
 
Statist interpretations are correct to emphasize that Kant regards a public legal order 
as indispensable for freedom and the enjoyment of Right. Only a state, they can point 
out, has “a collective general (common and powerful will” that can provide assurance 
of enforcement of “freedom in accordance with universal laws” (MM 6: 256). As 
mentioned, Kant makes this argument in connection with the question of property 
rights. Only a common will, and not a unilateral will, can “serve as a coercive law for 
everyone with regard to possession that is external and therefore contingent” (MM 6: 
256). In the same connection, Kant introduces a distinction between “provisional 
rights” and “conclusive rights.” In the state of nature, individuals may have 
provisional rights to property "in anticipation and preparation for the civil condition" 
but these rights are only made conclusive by the common and coercive will of the 
state (MM 6: 257). Our question is whether this argument entails that Kant must 
15 
 
regard domestic Right as not only necessary but also sufficient for conclusive 
possession. 
 
We should consider here what exactly Kant takes “conclusive possession” to be. More 
precisely, we must ask if an individual state on its own, with no regard to other states 
and their subjects, conclusively can determine the rights of its own citizens, 
particularly their property rights. Thus, in the paragraph just quoted, Kant writes, 
"possession found in an actual civil condition would be conclusive possession" (MM 6: 
257). First, it is important to understand that Kant is not making a purely empirical 
argument of the Hobbesian kind, which says that only under the sword of the 
sovereign is the property of the subjects secure.39 For Kant, the civil condition solves 
a moral and not merely an empirical problem.40 That is, it solves the problem not only 
of establishing and monopolizing sufficient power to secure property and hold down 
conflict, but also the moral problem of realizing the principle that no one should be 
subject to the unilateral will of another. Thus, if the notion of conclusive possession 
is to fit into Kant's normative conception of Right, it must satisfy the normative 
criterion presented in the UPR, as well as realize the innate right to freedom as 
independence. We see this also from the fact that when Kant in this context speaks 
of a “civil condition” (eine Zustande einer bürgerlichen Verfassung), he is not speaking of 
any old state but a state that does not “infringe upon … a priori principles for a civil 
condition” (MM 6: 256). 
 
Second, if an individual state on its own conclusively could secure the rights of its 
subjects, it is unclear why Kant regards the two other levels of Right, international 
and cosmopolitan Right, as part of the same general concept of Right. Alternatively, we 
have the possibility that these further levels of Right are needed for merely 
instrumental reasons, for example, that peace would be a mere causal means to protect 
the individual states' capacity to uphold their internal rightful condition. But this 
would make naught of Kant's claim that "universal and lasting peace constitutes not 
merely a part of the doctrine of right but rather the entire final end of the doctrine of 
right within the limits of mere reason" (MM 6: 355). In the same section, Kant clearly 
sees peace in normative and categorical terms, and as a condition of the conclusiveness 
of property rights. Thus, he continues: "the condition of peace is alone that condition 
in which what is mine and what is yours for a multitude of human beings is secured under laws 
living under proximity to one another, hence those who are united under a 
                                                          
39 [Ref Hobbes] 
40 Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2009, 164; Christian F. Rostbøll, Immanuel Kant. Copenhagen: 
Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2015, 55. 
16 
 
constitution … [the rules of which are] derived a priori by reason from the ideal of a 
rightful association of human beings under public laws as such” (MM 6: 355, first 
emphasis added). We see here both the individualist basis of Kant’s conception of 
Right – its basis in relations of human beings – and that it would be a mistake to 
understand the international and cosmopolitan levels of Right as independent of this 
basis, or as mere instrumental additions to the Right of a state. 
 
In terms of exposition, it is true that Kant, before reaching the international and 
cosmopolitan levels, has made the argument that a public legal order in the form of 
the sovereign state is a precondition for securing individual rights. Thus, he seems to 
have committed himself to the view that the sovereign state is not merely a necessary 
but also a sufficient condition for securing the rights of individuals. This is the case, 
because the state constitutes its subjects' standing as persons with equal rights of 
independence. Consequently, when Kant in the Second Definitive Article in 
"Perpetual Peace" speaks of a federalism of free states, he writes that "states … 
already have a rightful constitution internally and hence have outgrown the constraint 
of others to bring them under a more extended law-governed constitution in 
accordance with their concept of right" (PP 8: 356).41 We attain here a picture as if 
the individual state's internally rightful constitution were a fait accompli, which the two 
other levels of Right must acknowledge and leave as is. 
 
However, it is unsatisfactory to regard domestic Right as conclusively and fully settled 
independently of international and cosmopolitan Right. It is unsatisfactory, first, 
because in an interdependent world, we cannot neatly separate the relations a state 
has to its own subjects and the relations it has to other states, and, second, because a 
state not only has relations to other states as states but also to their subjects. Kant, of 
course, acknowledges both of these points. They are the reason for his 
cosmopolitanism. Thus, he writes, "it has now come so far with the (narrower or 
wider) community of nations of the earth that a violation of right on one place of the 
earth is felt in all," and, thus cosmopolitan right is "a supplement to the unwritten 
code of the right of a state and the right of nations necessary for the sake of any public 
human rights [zum öffentlichen Menschenrechte überhaupt] and so for perpetual peace" (PP 
8: 360).42 If cosmopolitan Right is necessary for human rights "überhaupt," it makes 
no sense to regard domestic public Right as a fait accompli, which already conclusively 
secures and determines the rights of individual human beings. As Kant himself 
                                                          
41 Byrd and Hruschka (Kant's Doctrine of Right, 195-6) points out that Kant abandons this 
position in the “Doctrine of Right.” They add that the position in “Perpetual Peace “is 
beside the point anyway, since logically an internal constitution cannot unilaterally govern 
the state’s external relations to other states.” 
42 Translation in Kant (1996) revised. 
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proposes in “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim,” “The problem 
of establishing a perfect civil constitution is dependent on the problem of a lawful 
external relation between states and cannot be solved without the latter” (Idea 8: 24, 
emphasis changed). 
 
 
V. Beyond the state as “simply a power” 
 
The justification for establishing state authority in Kant is first and foremost that it 
solves the problem of unilateral acquisition among human beings in the state of 
nature. In principle, the legal procedures of the state overcome unilaterality by 
establishing a common and public will that has no purposes of its own but exists only 
for the sake of maintaining a rightful condition of equal freedom for its members. 
Things look differently at the international level. Since – or insofar as – the individual 
states are already rightful conditions with no purpose other than establishing a rightful 
condition, a state is disanalogous to an individual who has purposes of his or her own. 
However, seen from the global perspective, the state is still a unilateral will when it 
enforces its right to territory (and its inhabitants property rights) vis-à-vis other states 
and their citizens. This is Kant’s conundrum, and it is the reason why he says states 
have “outgrown the constraint of others" (PP 8: 355-6). In other words, the problem 
is that Kant on the one hand has described the state as possessing an omnilateral will 
with no purposes of its own and on the other hand cannot deny that from an 
international and a cosmopolitan perspective, the state must be regarded merely as a 
particular will.  
 
Perhaps, we could say that the individual states can make rights conclusive for those 
on their respective territories, while cosmopolitan Right secures only the rights of 
travelers. This would fit Kant's point that "cosmopolitan right shall be limited to 
conditions of universal hospitality," as the "Third Definitive Article for Perpetual 
Peace" has it (PP 8: 357).43 There is a dilemma here, however. The dilemma is that 
while a state in relation to its own subjects is rightful, in relation to other peoples or 
states, it is "simply a power" (MM 6: 311). In other words, without international and 
cosmopolitan Right, the state in relation to other states and in relation to foreigners 
has no claim to legitimacy and authority. One might say that this does not affect the 
state’s relation to its own citizens and its ability to secure their rights.44 But consider 
                                                          
43 [See Meckstroh 2017.] 
44 Louis-Philippe Hodgson, "Realizing External Freedom: The Kantian Argument for a 
World State," In: Elisabeth Ellis, ed. Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications. 
University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012, pp. 108-9, 124. 
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the paradigmatic case of property rights. A state that grants property rights to its 
citizen at the same time excludes other states and their citizens from this property.45 
And because a state does this as a power, when there is no international and 
cosmopolitan Right, it acts as a unilateral will against foreigners. The only way to avoid 
this conclusion is to assume that the state’s territorial rights can be seen as somehow 
given and beyond the need for justification to other states and people. The latter 
assumption would entail that a state’s right to its territory does not raise any question 
of unilateral acquisition. 
 
The argument that there is no problem of unilateral acquisition among sovereign 
states relies on the premise that a state's territory is like a person’s body which it does 
not acquire but which it simply has. And, as a result, the state's territory is not in need 
of omnilateral authorization.46 But surely, we cannot simply treat a state like a natural 
person with an innate right to freedom. A state is a conventional and legal entity, and 
“a state’s borders are not natural in the way that a person’s body is.”47 When Kant 
accepts the territorial integrity of a state, he does so not because it has "what is 
required in order to be called a right" but, rather, because it was "taken to be legitimate 
according to the public opinion of every state at the time" (PP 8: 347). As Lea Ypi 
has argued, Kant can only speak of a state’s territorial possession in this manner, 
because he regards it as acquired unilaterally and not innately possessed.48 
 
To be sure, Kant does speak of the state as “a trunk [with] its own roots,” and "as a 
moral person" that should not be "made into a thing" (PP 8: 344). However, this well-
known paragraph from "Perpetual Peace" ends with the admonition that treating a 
state as a mere thing that can be acquired by another state through inheritance, 
exchange, purchase, or donation has the result that "the subjects are thereby used and 
used up as things to be managed at one's discretion" (PP 8: 344, emphasis added). 
The position that Kant stakes out here is important to understand his anti-
colonialism, but I think it would be a mistake to read it as an indication of either a 
statist or an anti-individualist view. The fact that Kant ends the paragraph in which 
he speaks of the state as a moral person with how the subjects are treated demonstrates 
that he agrees with the moral individualist view, according to which “all moral wrongs 
are ultimately wrongs to individuals.”49 The reason why a state should not be made 
                                                          
45 Merten Reglitz," A Kantian Argument Against World Poverty," European Journal of Political 
Theory  2016: 1474885116662566; Lea Ypi, "A Permissive Theory of Territorial Rights," 
European Journal of Philosophy 22/2 (2012), 288-312, pp. 297-302. 
46 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 227-28; Mikalsen, 2017, 16. 
47 Holland, “The Perpetual Peace Puzzle,” 608. 
48 Ypi, "A Permissive Theory of Territorial Rights," 304. 
49 Altman and Wellman, 285. 
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into a thing is that this would make its members into things. Thus, in Kant, as already 
suggested, the state has no intrinsic value in the sense of ultimate value. Only 
individual human beings have such value. 
 
Some commentators have attempted to give an individualist, Kantian argument for 
states’ rights to territorial integrity. One such argument derives states’ rights from the 
individual right to freedom as independence. Thus, Louis-Philippe Hodgson writes, 
"an individual can only be truly independent from the choices of others if the agent 
that secures her independence is itself independent. In other words, to be genuine, 
independence must go all the way up. A state can thus only perform its function if it is 
entitled to the same kind of independence as are its citizens."50 In relation to 
possession, this means that a state can only make its citizens' property rights 
conclusive, if its own territorial integrity is secure.51 While this argument gains 
plausibility insofar as it does not deny Kant’s individualism, I think it is individualist 
in the wrong way. Thus, Hodgson’s argument treats public Right as a mere instrument 
to the realization of the end of freedom as independence, which he understands 
independently of the institutions of public Right. In this way, he fails to acknowledge 
the constitutive relationship between public Right and freedom, as well as what I have 
called Kant’s relational notion of freedom.52   
 
Even if Hodgson acknowledged that the relationship between domestic public Right 
and freedom is constitutive rather than merely causal, the further logic of his argument 
treats the other two levels of Right, international and cosmopolitan Right, as mere 
instruments to the primary form of Right, that between the state and its members. 
Thus, there is the drawback that we have a normative argument for the rightful 
relationship between the state and its subjects – based on the innate right to freedom 
as independence – and a merely empirical argument that says that the state to serve 
its function in relation to its citizens must have territorial integrity. In that case, there 
is a moral argument for territorial integrity but it is only directed to the subjects of the 
separate states seen in isolation from one another. The argument the state can give to 
other states and their citizens for its territorial rights and its exclusion of them from their 
territory can only be an empirical and derivative one: it is functionally necessary for 
each state to have an independent territory to secure the rights of its citizens’. Thereby, 
this argument privileges one subset of relations of Right at the cost of the others, 
which means that it does not sufficiently explain how a state can address outsiders in 
                                                          
50 Hodgson, "Realizing External Freedom," 114. 
51 Hodgson, "Realizing External Freedom," 116. 
52. Hodgson has a “freedom-based view,” which gives freedom independent value and sees 
public law as instrumental for realizing this value (Zylberman2016: 101-102, 105). 
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their relations with it, most prominently when the state enforces its territorial integrity 
against them. 
 
Arguments focusing on the territorial rights of states, including the one just 
considered, tend to imply that the only purpose of international right is to secure and 
maintain existing boundaries between territorial states – or more precisely, to protect 
the territorial integrity of internally legitimate states.53 In this way, international Right 
comes after, and is secondary to, domestic Right and simply makes the independence 
of the agents (the states) that protect the independence of human beings a matter of 
lawful arbitration rather than force or war. For the states and their members, 
international Right has a normative dimension as securing their freedom as 
independence. But to other individuals, experiencing the coercion to which they are 
subject in relation to foreign states, no direct normative justification is provided. The laws 
of a foreign state stands for nonmbers as mere force, "simply a power." Thus, it is a 
shortcoming of this argument and this interpretation of Kant that it gives a 
justification of states’ rights only from the perspective of the members of the state as 
members and not to outsiders. This ignores the cosmopolitan condition in which “a 
violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all” (PP 8: 360). 
 
Kant’s claim that “a violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all” is a favorite 
among contemporary cosmopolitans,54 but what exactly does it mean? If we follow 
the constitutive and relational interpretation, Kant must be speaking of a violation of 
the rules that regulate the relations in which we stand to one another as interconnected 
human beings. This violation cannot be understood solely from the first-personal 
perspective of the individual’s feelings or empirical opportunities. Rather, it is a matter 
of the rights and duties the individual can claim and must accept in her relations with 
other people and peoples across the globe. A violation of Right on one place of the 
earth is felt in all, because we are all part of one community in which the standing of 
each depends on the standing of all. By this is not meant that a breach of law in one 
place of the earth is necessarily felt in all, but that if a part of the earth rejects being 
part of the common system of Right then this affects the system as a whole. Those 
parts of the earth that do not accept the shared tripartite system of Right would affect 
the standing of the rest of humanity as well. 
 
                                                          
53 This last clarification is important to understand, for example, Anna Stilz’ (2011) Kantian 
argument for territorial rights, "Nations, States, and Territory," Ethics 121/3 (2011): 572-
601. 
54 See e.g. Martha Nussbaum, "Kant and Cosmopolitanism," in Perpetual Peace: Essays on 
Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal, ed. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge, MA: 
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Yet, Kant clearly does regard state sovereignty as important. One reason for this is 
that he regards it as contradictory for a state to submit to a coercive global order, 
because a state is defined by being a supreme authority (PP 8: 354; MM 6: 319). To 
this, we can reply that sovereignty is not an all or nothing matter,55 which would help 
Kant out of his conundrum. Another reason to regard state sovereignty as important 
is that it could be seen as required as a way to respect the autonomy and self-
determination of its members. The state as a rightful condition is a collective 
achievement of its members and to respect their autonomy, other states should not 
force them to join juridical-political relations with them.56 To this argument, we can 
reply, first, that even if states should not be forced against their will to join global 
juridical relations, this does not imply that states ought not (freely) enter such 
relations.57 Second, the argument for state sovereignty based on respect for the self-
determination of its members assumes that only the internal perspective of members 
matters and ignores the effects of state sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction on non-
members. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Kant’s Philosophy of Right contains a unique understanding of the relationship 
between public law and individual freedom, which we find neither in Kant’s own 
moral philosophy nor in most contemporary cosmopolitan theory. However, among 
many contemporary Kant scholars, this relationship of co-constitution between Right 
and freedom is given a statist reading, which does not do justice to the cosmopolitan 
character of Kant’s Philosophy of Right. This is a serious drawback, both because it 
fails to acknowledge that Kant’s Philosophy of Right is inherently and not merely 
accidently cosmopolitan, and because our world today is in dire need of an 
understanding of what Right beyond the nation state could mean. 
 
The suggestion of this paper is that we should extend Kant’s concept of “freedom in 
the external relation of people to one another” from domestic Right to the common 
end of Right also for the relation between states and between states and non-
                                                          
55 Beitz 1994, 128. 
56 Pauline Kleingeld, "Approaching Perpetual Peace: Kant’s Defence of a League of States 
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members. This means that the core issue of Right, not only at the domestic level but 
also globally, is what kind of standing persons have vis-à-vis one another, that is, 
which rights and duties they have in relation to one another. This standing is not 
merely a moral standing of equal moral worth but rather a standing that is partly 
constituted and created by a common public legal order, and which can exist only in 
virtue of a global public legal order. What exact form this global order of Right should 
have is secondary to the argument made in this paper. The primary issue is that this 
order of global Right must secure the freedom in the external relation of all human 
beings and must extent to all the relations that human beings have with one another. 
Thus, when we discuss issues of state sovereignty, territorial rights, and global 
institutions, we must ask how these affect the standing of every single human being 
in relation to all others. Specifically, we must make sure that none of the relations 
among persons are lawless and thus left to mere force. Because freedom in Kant is 
an ordered and rightful relation among persons, cosmopolitanism for him is not a 
matter of unfettered and unrestricted global action but, rather, a “publicly lawful … 
constitution” (PP 8: 358), which secures legally ordered global interaction that 
respects the institutions that make freedom possible and constitute the equal juridical 
standing of each and every person in relation to the rest. 
 
What characterizes a truly global and cosmopolitan system of Right is that it does not 
privilege one subset of relations of Right at the cost of other relations of Right. The 
latter is what happens in statist accounts, which privilege the external relations of 
freedom among members of a state at the cost of the relations a state has to other 
states and non-members. Protecting state sovereignty may for contingent reasons be 
the best current means for promoting people’s standing as free persons, but in an 
interconnected world it cannot secure the equal freedom in the external relation of all 
human beings. In the bounded sphere, which the earth is,58 the territorial rights of 
one state and the property rights of its members cannot but affect the territorial rights 
of other states and the property rights of their members. The cosmopolitan and 
relational view of Right advanced in this paper requires that we approach this fact not 
from the limited perspective of the freedom of members of one state at a time but 
that we take the all-encompassing and systemic perspective of the relations of all 
human beings.  
 
Thus, we must acknowledge that the sovereign state is not the final answer to how to 
secure the rights of individuals. If we are to stay true to the fundamental principles of 
Kant's Philosophy of Right, we should not treat the sovereign state as capable of 
establishing conclusive rights for its members. This form of sovereign decision-
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making will affect not only members but also non-members who will be subject to a 
mere power, or a unilateral will, which is incompatible with the universal coexistence 
of freedom in the relation between members and non-members. If Kant's system of 
Right – and our system of Right – is to attain unity at the global level, it cannot give 
equal weight to the rights of individuals on the one side and the right of states on the 
other side. It must be committed to the principle of equal freedom in the external 
relation of all human beings to one another. Hence, all the relations among human 
beings must be ordered by law, also those that cross state borders. This conclusion 
becomes inconceivable, if one insists on a morality of sovereign states and denies the 
individualist basis of Kant’s cosmopolitanism. 
 
The conclusion that the system of Right can attain unity only if all three levels of Right 
in the end are understood with reference to the same principle of equal freedom for 
individuals should not be misunderstood as an argument in favor of seeing legal 
cosmopolitanism as directly derived from moral cosmopolitanism. In Kant, a public 
legal order is not a mere instrument for realizing a pre-conceived principle. Rather, 
we can only fully conceive of the idea of freedom in the external relation of people to 
one another with or through a notion of public law. The perspective from which we 
with Kant should approach the global system is at the same time juridical and 
individualist. Equal freedom in the external relation of human beings to one another 
is what Right means in all their relations, domestically and globally. 
